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INTRODUCTION 
In Pragmatism Rules,
1
 Professor Elizabeth Porter takes 
up the understudied topic of the proper methodology for 
interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Porter’s 
view of Rules interpretation in the Supreme Court calls for 
increased deference towards lower-court application of the 
Rules within the confines of varied and factually rich cases.
2
  
While we find much to laud in Porter’s article, we conclude 
that her view ultimately undervalues the institutional 
advantages inherent in the court rulemaking process when it 
comes to the crafting of new procedural policy. 
Porter’s theory of Rules interpretation fundamentally is 
one based upon deference to the lower federal courts.
3
  In 
coming to this position, she argues that the Supreme Court 
engages in two distinct modes of Rules interpretation, which 
she in turn links to appropriate levels of deference.
4
  At 
times, she argues, the Court tackles Rules cases making use 
of the traditional tools of statutory construction by focusing 
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 Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2015). 
 
2
 Id. at 177. 
 
3
 Id. 
 
4
 Id. at 130. 
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closely upon the text of the Rules.
5
  This is a familiar 
approach to Rules interpretation.
6
  At other times, Porter 
contends, the Court engages with the Rules in a 
“managerial” mode.7  In these instances, the Court eschews 
a close alignment with text and drafters intent as the 
lodestar of Rules interpretation in favor of enacting its own 
policy choices or by crafting an equitable result in light of 
the unique facts of the case.  These competing modes of 
reasoning, Porter argues, are both legitimate means of 
interpreting the Rules.
8
  Having found that both the 
statutory and managerial approaches are sound, Porter 
adopts a Chevron-inspired analogy whereby these different 
modes of interpretation are linked to different levels of 
deference to the lower courts.
9
  Thus, in what she labels as 
pure statutory interpretation cases, the Supreme Court 
should adopt de novo review of the decision below and 
deploy traditional tools of statutory construction.
10
  In 
managerial cases, however, she argues for an abuse-of-
discretion review in the Supreme Court, and remand for the 
application of any newly fashioned standards by the lower 
courts.
11
  By applying a deferential standard of review and 
remanding in these managerial cases for lower court 
application of standards, Porter asserts that the Supreme 
Court’s future procedural decisions would become “more 
genuinely minimalist,”12 and her proposal would therefore 
limit the Court’s excessive activism in such cases.13 
Porter’s article performs a valuable service by drawing 
attention to the remarkably overlooked significance of the 
entire topic of “rules interpretation.”  The lack of attention to 
civil rules interpretation is all the more glaring given the 
revived scholarly interest in statutory interpretation and the 
links between interpretive theories and foundational 
normative commitments,
14
 and the Court’s increased 
 
 
5
 Id. at 131–36. 
 
6
 See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) 
(suggesting that the Rules should be interpreted as if they were statutes). 
 
7
 Porter, supra note 1, at 136–42. 
 
8
 Id. at 175. 
 
9
 Id. at 176–78. 
 
10
 Id. at 177. 
 
11
 Id. at 177–78. 
 
12
 Id. at 184. 
 
13
 Id. at 184–85. 
 
14
 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The 
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992) 
(recognizing this revival in its early stages). 
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number of Rules cases over the past decade.
15
  Porter has 
also made important contributions to the literature by 
articulating these two competing paradigms of rules 
interpretation and by identifying the legitimate foundations 
for each of these approaches in the rulemaking process and 
other potentially relevant sources of guidance.  Finally, she 
has provided an administrative-law-inspired proposal to 
synthesize these competing methods of rules interpretation, 
which could conceivably improve in some ways upon the 
current approach.  As if that were not enough, Porter has 
accomplished all of this in a single article that is a pleasure 
to read and, unusually for this genre, could fairly be 
described as entertaining and even humorous.  As two of the 
handful of scholars who have previously devoted attention to 
the problem of rules interpretation,
16
 we greatly appreciate 
the foregoing contributions. 
Indeed, there is much in Porter’s work with which we 
readily agree.  We concur with her that it is useful to 
distinguish between differing modes of interpretation 
employed by the Court in Rules cases.
17
  We concur with 
Porter that much of the Rules regime involves grants of 
discretion to the lower courts for case-by-case application of 
equitable standards within the confines of the unique facts 
of particular cases.  We also agree with Porter that the Court 
is entirely competent to use traditional tools of statutory 
construction to resolve interpretive problems involving the 
Federal Rules.  We further subscribe to Porter’s position that 
it can be helpful to use principles of administrative law to 
 
 
15
 See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure 
Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 316 (2012). 
 
16
 See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s 
Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons From Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 1188 (2012) [hereinafter Mulligan & Staszewski]; Lumen N. Mulligan & 
Glen Staszewski, Scholarship highlight: Who should resolve issues relating to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 17, 2012, 10:41 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/scholarship-highlight-who-should-
resolve-issues-relating-to-the-federal-rules-of-civil-procedure/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZX7-3D54]. 
 
17
 While Porter distinguishes managerial rules interpretation from 
statutory interpretation, we believe that managerial interpretation is 
compatible with certain relatively freewheeling approaches to statutory 
interpretation, and that it could therefore properly be understood as a form of 
statutory interpretation. Because as Porter points out, the Federal Rules are 
not statutes, this debate is largely academic.  On the other hand, we also 
believe that the category of “managerial rules interpretation” contains at least 
two distinct components, which are very important to disentangle.  The 
different components of managerial rules interpretation and their proper 
treatment are discussed below in Part 1.B. 
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evaluate the best approach for the Court to use in regulating 
the field of civil procedure, and we are pleased that Porter 
has picked up on our suggestion to do so.
18
 
We part ways with Porter, however, on the best way to 
implement what she characterizes as “managerial Rules 
interpretation.”19  As explained below, we think that this 
particular category actually involves at least two distinct 
types of cases, each of which merits its own special 
treatment.
20
  First, some “managerial cases” involve the 
creation of new policy or changes to the controlling 
understanding of the Rules.  Based on an assessment of the 
competencies of the relevant institutional actors, we think 
that the Court should refer such cases to the Advisory 
Committee for resolution pursuant to the court rulemaking 
process.  Second, other “managerial cases” involve 
interpretations of the Rules, often through a purposive lens, 
where the Court fine-tunes or clarifies the meaning or 
parameters of the equitable standards that must be applied 
by the lower courts.  While such cases plainly depart from a 
narrow textualism and tend to exhibit reasoning more 
characteristic of the legal process school, we think it 
appropriate for the Court to provide such guidance pursuant 
to adjudication and for lower courts to implement the 
clarified standards on remand.  It is our position, then, that 
these differing types of “managerial” cases should be treated 
differently, with the former being referred to the Advisory 
Committee and the latter (in line with Porter’s position) being 
remanded to the lower courts. 
We contend in this essay that our model is better suited 
than Porter’s to match the actual competencies of each of 
the respective institutional actors—the Supreme Court, the 
Advisory Committee, and the lower courts—and that it 
would therefore result in the best available mix of statutory 
 
 
18
 See generally Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court is analogous to administrative agencies when dealing with 
questions of civil procedure); Porter, supra note 1, at 130 (recognizing that our 
work “recently . . . analogized the Court to an agency, in order to demonstrate 
that the Court is insufficiently deferential to the rulemaking process”). 
 
19
 See Porter, supra note 1, at 137. 
 
20
 As explained below, some “managerial cases” merely involve the 
application of equitable standards to the facts of a particular case.  See infra 
Part I.  While we agree with Porter that the Court should review any such 
cases for an abuse of discretion by the lower courts, we tend to think that the 
Court should not be reviewing those decisions in the first place.  Porter, supra 
note 1, at 178.  A managerial Court should ordinarily defer to the lower courts 
in routine cases of this nature by not reviewing their decisions at all. 
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and managerial rules interpretation.
21
  In particular, our 
proposed model would take full advantage of the benefits 
provided by using the court rulemaking process established 
by Congress for making policy changes to the Federal Rules.  
Our proposed model would also allow lower courts to 
continue exercising the equitable discretion that is 
contemplated by many rules (with some additional guidance, 
when necessary, from the Court) and to continue to 
experiment with different approaches to achieving the best 
practices on procedural matters.  We recognize that our 
proposal would leave a great deal of policy discretion in the 
hands of lower courts and the Advisory Committee, but we 
claim that this is a feature rather than a bug of our model.  
Moreover, we believe that our proposed model is consistent 
with the scheme established by Congress under the Rules 
Enabling Act.
22
  That said, we have previously advocated 
changes to the court rulemaking process that would improve 
its efficiency and likely enhance the role of the justices.  We 
therefore conclude by explaining how certain changes to the 
court rulemaking process could enhance the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of civil rules interpretation in the federal 
judicial system. 
I 
EVALUATING THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH 
In this part, we turn to an examination of Porter’s 
proposal.  In sum, Porter argues that in “managerial” cases 
the Supreme Court should opt for a policy of deference 
toward lower-court application of standards as opposed to 
Supreme Court application, and that this approach will curb 
the Court’s interpretive excesses.  We argue that Porter’s 
position does not adequately distinguish among the different 
types of cases that fall within her “managerial mode.”  
Separating these distinct types of cases, we contend, 
illustrates where Porter’s theory both hits a bull’s eye and 
where it goes wide of the mark.  In subpart B, we further 
elaborate our position and its advantages for promoting 
 
 
21
 Our proposed model is consistent with the increasingly prominent view 
that methods of legal interpretation should be informed by the actual 
competencies of the relevant institutional actors.  See, e.g., Michael Herz, 
Purposivism and Institutional Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 91 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003). 
 
22
 See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006)). 
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institutional competence.  In our view, taking an 
institutional-advantages, not an inherent-authority, point of 
view best directs when a matter should be left for lower-
court discretion, Supreme Court adjudication, or Advisory 
Committee review. 
A. Critiquing Porter’s Lower-Court Deference Approach 
While we agree with Porter that in questions of statutory 
construction the Supreme Court is best suited to resolve 
disputes through adjudication, we think that her category of 
managerial rules interpretation requires fine-tuning.  For 
starters, in using the term “managerial rules interpretation,” 
Porter purposefully invokes
23
 Professor Judith Resnik’s 
discussion of judges as litigation managers as opposed to 
traditional adjudicators.
24
  This managerial label, however, 
seems to us problem-inducing.  To begin, Resnik’s 
discussion focuses upon how district court judges handle 
discovery and explosive docket growth.
25
  It is not an 
interpretive theory for statutes, or the Rules.  As such, we 
fail to see a strong connection between Resnik’s insights and 
Porter’s theory of deference in interpretation. 
More importantly, providing a unitary label—
managerial—artificially conflates at least two disparate types 
of cases that Porter herself identifies.  Indeed, Porter 
includes Supreme Court-initiated policymaking or changes 
to the controlling understanding of the Rules as one 
instantiation of the “managerial mode.”26  She also identifies 
Supreme Court-exercised, equitable discretion as another 
instance of this mode.
27
  To be sure, we equally erred in our 
own past work by focusing primarily upon policymaking 
cases, while giving relatively short shrift to equity-standard-
setting cases.
28
  Porter’s work has therefore helpfully pushed 
 
 
23
 See Porter, supra note 1, at 126 n.13. 
 
24
 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
 
25
 Id. at 378–80. 
 
26
 Porter, supra note 1, at 136–39. 
 
27
 Id. at 139–42; see also id. at 179 (explaining that the managerial mode 
includes “reviewing decisions that involve the lower courts’ application of a 
legal standard to the particular facts of an individual case”). 
 
28
 Compare Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1215–34 (providing 
administrative-law analogies designed to identify policy-change issues or 
cases), with id. at 1226–27 (recognizing the propriety of the Court’s practice of 
deciding equitable-standards cases pursuant to adjudication).  See also Porter, 
supra note 1, at 182 (“[I]t is unclear how courts could resolve any questions 
involving equitable discretion rather than statutory interpretation—questions 
that are endemic to Rules interpretation—under the division of labor proposed 
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us to refine and clarify our own views.  As a result, we are 
now all the more confident that these are two very different 
types of cases—policymaking and equity-standard-setting—
which call for differing treatment.  We refer to these two 
distinct sets of managerial cases differently, therefore, as 
“policy-change” cases and as “equity” cases.29 
Porter contrasts these managerial cases with statutory-
interpretation cases.  Here she contends that a statutory-
interpretation approach to the Rules is at odds with “the 
Rules’ equitable roots,” and that this statutory-interpretation 
approach tends “toward becoming hypertechnical and 
harsh.”30  By contrast, in her view, managerial 
interpretations are “imbued with a sense of flexibility and 
fairness.”31  While we agree with Porter that “policy-change” 
interpretations differ greatly from statutory-interpretation 
cases,
32
 which is why we recommend that policy-change 
cases be referred to the Advisory Committee,
33
 we do not 
think that “equitable-discretion” cases, which Porter also 
labels as managerial, are necessarily distinct from statutory-
interpretation cases at the Supreme Court level.  On the 
contrary, we believe that the Court can properly clarify how 
such standards should be applied as a general matter by the 
lower courts—and that this function is compatible with 
traditional tools of statutory construction, broadly 
construed.
34
  This is the case when the Court uses a 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation to add flesh 
to the bones of Rules that were consciously designed to be 
applied in an equitable fashion. 
Despite Porter’s assumption, a statutory-interpretation 
approach to the rules can often lead to a discretionary 
standard for lower courts.  It is key to recall that the Rules 
 
by Mulligan and Staszewski.”). 
 
29
 As noted above, we also think that “equity” cases can be further divided 
between those that merely involve application of a discretionary standard to 
the facts of a particular case, and those that involve refining or clarifying the 
equitable standard for future cases.  See supra note 20 and accompanying 
text.  Although the Court should rarely grant certiorari in the former category 
of cases, the latter category of cases can be used to provide valuable guidance 
to the lower courts in some circumstances. 
 
30
 Porter, supra note 1, at 175. 
 
31
 Id. 
 
32
 Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1215–34. 
 
33
 Id. at 1190. 
 
34
 In reality, the distinction between managerial rules interpretation and 
statutory rules interpretation is probably a continuum, rather than two 
distinct categories—which Porter also seems to acknowledge.  See Porter, 
supra note 1, at 135–36. 
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aim to meld together law and equity practice as well as to 
codify many older common law practices that emerged from 
these separate systems.
35
  It should be no surprise, then, 
that as a matter of statutory interpretation many of the 
Rules themselves call for lower-court discretion.
36
  As we 
have previously argued, although not with the precision that 
Porter’s work has properly demanded,37 we embrace these 
lower-court-, equity-, and discretionary- focused 
interpretations.  In Foman v. Davis,
38
 for example, the Court 
addressed when a district court could decline a motion for 
leave to amend a pleading when the text of the Rule was not 
self-defining, although the intent of the drafters was clear.  
The Court approached the question of defining Rule 15’s 
then-drafted language—“leave to amend shall be freely given 
when justice so requires”39—by deploying a traditional 
statutory-interpretation strategy.  The Court thus read the 
Rule 15 provision as a part of the statute (i.e., the Rules) as 
a whole.
40
  The Court, in this manner, interpreted the leave-
to-amend provision in Rule 15 vis-à-vis the general goals of 
Rule 1 and the pleading standards established by Rule 
8(a)(2) as then interpreted by Conley,
41
 and delineated 
several standards, such as futility or bad faith, for when an 
amendment should not be allowed.
42
  Apart from those who 
equate statutory construction only with a strict brand of 
textualism, the methodology deployed in Foman, and in 
many other cases, involves the use of traditional tools of 
statutory construction that predominated shortly after the 
Federal Rules were promulgated and continue to form the 
core of statutory interpretation for many scholars and 
jurists.
43
 
 
 
35
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 2; see also Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A 
New Federal Civil Procedure – I. The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 393 (1935) 
(discussing the substantial union of law and equity in federal courts, despite 
the formal divisions that existed at the time). 
 
36
 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave [to 
amend the pleadings] when justice so requires.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he 
court may impose an appropriate sanction . . . .”). 
 
37
 Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1227. 
 
38
 Foman v. Davis, Ex’x, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 
 
39
 Id. at 182 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)). 
 
40
 Id.; see also Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 
(1992) (stating that the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined by reference to, among other things, the broader context of the 
statute as a whole). 
 
41
 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 
42
 Foman, 371 U.S. at 181–82. 
 
43
 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 85 (2005) (“[C]ontrast[ing] a 
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The only manner in which we differ from Porter here is 
in her apparent insistence upon calling such decisions non-
statutory, or managerial, and failing to distinguish these 
equity-standard-setting cases from cases that involve major 
policy change.  Despite Porter’s insinuations, not all 
“statutory interpretations” of the Rules call for rigid, non-
flexible, “the rule of law as a law of rules” approaches.44  A 
statutory-interpretation approach to Rule 11(c)(1), for 
example, clearly illustrates that sanctions are to be 
discretionary.
45
  And this is but one example.  Indeed, the 
Committee Notes to the 2007 amendments clearly state that 
the drafters often intend lower-court discretion; moreover, 
this discretionary approach can be invoked by way of 
standard statutory construction when the drafters use the 
term “may.”46  Thus, by labeling the application or 
clarification of rules that grant lower-court discretion as 
non-statutory interpretations, Porter creates schisms 
between a so-called managerial approach and a statutory-
construction approach that need not exist.  Simply put, a 
statutory-construction approach often leads to lower-court 
discretion.  These are often consistent, not competing, 
approaches.  We agree with Porter, moreover, that if and 
when the Court reviews a lower court’s application of one of 
these discretionary standards, it should do so solely for an 
abuse of discretion.
47
  It is also a good idea, as she suggests, 
for the Court to remand cases of this nature for 
implementation by the lower courts when the Court clarifies 
the content or parameters of such equitable standards 
during adjudication.
48
 
Such action by Supreme Court adjudication, as opposed 
to Advisory Committee action, fits within our standard-tools-
of-interpretation exception to our preference for rulemaking.  
This is to say, when the text or purpose of the rule calls for a 
 
literal text-based approach with an approach that places more emphasis on 
statutory purpose . . . .”). 
 
44
 Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1187 (1989) (calling for an approach to interpretation that extends the 
mode of analysis of “the Rule of Law, the law of rules” as far as possible). 
 
45
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate 
sanction . . . .”). 
 
46
 FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 2007 Comm. Notes (“The restyled rules replace ‘shall’ 
with ‘must,’ ‘may,’ or ‘should,’ depending on which one the context and 
established interpretation make correct in each rule. . . .  ‘The court in its 
discretion may’ becomes ‘the court may’ . . . .”). 
 
47
 Porter, supra note 1, at 178. 
 
48
 Id. 
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discretionary, lower-court determination—which they often 
do—we fully endorse Porter’s approach.49  As such, Porter’s 
critique of our view,
50
 in which she claims that we would 
refer all cases of equitable discretion to the Advisory 
Committee as opposed to remanding to the lower courts (and 
to be fair, our past focus upon policy-change cases likely 
invited this reading), is not the one we intend.  When the 
Rules themselves call for the exercise of equitable discretion, 
we believe that the lower courts should exercise that 
discretion.
51
  In such instances, the Rules drafters have set a 
policy of district court discretionary action, the Supreme 
Court has interpreted that rule so as to give effect to that 
policy, and the lower courts correctly exercise their Rules-
given discretion against the Supreme Court setting of a more 
detailed standard.  In such instances, each institution—the 
Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and the lower 
courts—is acting squarely within the realm of its 
institutional competencies.  Moreover, it is difficult to believe 
that court rulemaking would ordinarily provide significant 
added value in these types of situations. 
We more fully part company from Porter in those cases 
she also labels as managerial but we contend are more 
precisely labeled as change-in-policy cases—these are the 
headline cases such as Daubert,
52
 Wal-Mart,
53
 Twombly,
54
 
and Iqbal,
55
 which were the primary focus of our previous 
article.  Here, Porter does not argue, as in the Foman 
example above, that the best interpretation of the Rule at 
issue is one granting lower-court discretion per se.  Rather, 
these are cases, in her view, in which the Court simply has a 
different policy preference than the position embodied in 
prior interpretations of the relevant rule or of the Advisory 
Committee itself.
56
  In such cases, Porter argues that the 
Court is fully empowered by its inherent authority and the 
Rules Enabling Act to make a change in Rules policy by way 
of adjudication as opposed to going through the rulemaking 
 
 
49
 Motions to amend are just such an example.  See, e.g., Technical 
Resource Servs. v. Dornier Medical Sys., 134 F.3d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(reviewing motions to amend under an abuse-of-discretion standard). 
 
50
 Porter, supra note 1, at 182. 
 
51
 Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1227. 
 
52
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 
53
 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 
54
 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 
55
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 
56
 Porter, supra note 1, at 154–56. 
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process.
57
 
Our objections here are two-fold.  First, unlike equitable-
discretion cases, we fail to see how the process of lower-
court deference (i.e., the remanding to a lower court for 
application of the new standard to the facts) will in any way 
constrain the Supreme Court in such policy-change cases.  
But this is precisely what Porter predicts.  She suggests that 
the largest error the Court made in cases such as Wal-Mart 
and Twombly was not in the crafting of a new standard for 
class-action certification or for pleading in the context of an 
adjudication.
58
  The error, in her view, was in the Court’s 
own application of the new standard to the facts of the case 
instead of remanding for the lower courts to so apply the 
new standard in the first instance.
59
 
To be sure, we tend to agree with Porter that remand is 
the more appropriate course as a matter of institutional 
capacities and resource allocation in such cases.
60
  The 
Supreme Court in more thoughtful moments tends to agree 
as well—the High Court is not an error-correction tribunal, 
but a forum for the resolution of matters of broad public 
importance.
61
  Nevertheless, we cannot agree with her 
conclusion that such a remand practice will moderate the 
effects of Supreme Court Rules decisions in policy-change 
cases.
62
  We find it highly unlikely that in a hypothetical 
remand in, say, Twombly—after the complete re-tooling of 
the pleading standard in light of the “retirement” of 
Conley
63—the lower court would have felt free to provide an 
application of the plausibility standard that meaningfully 
deviated from the one provided by the Supreme Court in the 
actual case.  Porter’s Daubert example, where the Court 
remanded back to the lower courts for the application of the 
new expert-witness standard, does not prove the point 
 
 
57
 Id. at 154. 
 
58
 See id. at 184–85. 
 
59
 Id. 
 
60
 Cf. Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1236 (arguing that the 
Court, following Supreme Court Rule 10, should only hear Rules cases that 
arise out of circuit splits or otherwise present important issues of federal law). 
 
61
 See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610–12 (2005) (discussing 
the division of labor between high courts and intermediate appellate courts in 
the context of a habeas case). 
 
62
 Cf. Porter, supra note 1, at 184 (arguing that adopting her “framework 
would return the Court to a tradition of narrower, more genuinely minimalist 
procedural decisions”). 
 
63
 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 
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either.
64
 By all accounts, Daubert completely revolutionized 
expert-witness certification; the act of remanding to the 
lower court in the first instance seems to have little 
restrained the impact of that ruling.
65
  Thus, if the goal of 
Porter’s approach is to “address these interpretive 
excesses,”66 she offers no compelling reasons to believe this 
result would follow merely from remanding in policy-change 
cases. 
Second, Porter’s critique of our preference for sending 
such policy-change issues to the Advisory Committee misses 
the mark.  She suggests that we think the Supreme Court 
lacks the authority to issue a policy change by 
adjudication.
67
  This is not our position.  As we have 
previously argued: “Although we propose the adoption of a 
presumption in favor of rulemaking on civil procedure 
issues, we do not challenge the Court’s inherent power, even 
when not coupled with statutory authority, to control court 
procedure by court order or by adjudication.”68 
Our proposed model is one premised upon institutional 
competencies, not authority.  Thus, our view is that among 
the federal lower courts, the Supreme Court, and the 
Advisory Committee, when it comes to making major 
changes to the policies underlying the Rules, the Advisory 
Committee possesses institutional advantages such that 
there should be a presumption in favor of referral to that 
committee instead of setting policy by adjudication in the 
Supreme Court.  Without re-arguing our position in full, we 
would note that there are at least four broad institutional 
advantages to rulemaking over adjudication in policy-change 
cases.
69
  First, rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication, is 
 
 
64
 Porter, supra note 1, at 184–85. 
 
65
 See, e.g., MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 5 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
702:5 (Westlaw 7th ed., Nov. 2015 Update) (“Daubert overall in practice 
actually created a more stringent test for expert evidence admissibility 
especially in civil cases.”); David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, 
Present, and Future of The General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS 385, 386 
(Spring 2001) (“[Daubert and its progeny] dramatically tighten the rules for the 
admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts and in states that have 
adopted [the Daubert test].”). 
 
66
 Porter, supra note 1, at 177. 
 
67
 Id. at 56 (“Mulligan and Staszewski . . . have argued in favor of applying 
a deference framework to the Court in Rules cases. But they have sought to 
apply that framework to require the Court to defer to the rulemaking process, 
not to the lower courts; in other words, they view the problem as one of 
judicial authority, rather than a problem of interpretation.”). 
 
68
 Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1213. 
 
69
 See id. at 1207–12. 
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widely viewed as a better procedure for making policy and 
exploring issues of legislative fact precisely because informal 
rulemaking procedures are specifically designed for this 
purpose.
70
  Second, anyone who is interested can participate 
in rulemaking, while adjudication is generally limited to the 
parties in a case.
71
  Third, the rulemaking method of making 
policy gives agencies greater control over their own agendas, 
allowing them to set priorities more easily and to implement 
their programmatic responsibilities rationally and 
comprehensively.
72
  Fourth, rulemaking is also widely 
understood to be fairer than adjudication to groups who are 
adversely affected by agency action, because newly-
established rules are prospective instead of retrospective and 
can be crafted to afford exceptions and the like.
73
 
Porter’s proposal foregoes all of these advantages in 
policy-change cases.  In our prior work, we noted that 
forgoing these advantages comes at substantial loss.  To be 
sure, cert-worthy cases do not walk into the Supreme Court 
and self-identify as equity-standard-setting or change-in-
policy ones; nor do they effortlessly link themselves to the 
fora holding the appropriate institutional capacities.  This is 
the problem of selecting the best decision-making forum.  
Nevertheless, we contend that the benefits of routing matters 
to the forum with superior institutional advantages outweigh 
the costs of selecting the best decision-making forum. 
This is not to say that developing a rubric for selecting 
the best forum for Rules cases is without its challenges.  In 
our prior work, while looking to institutional capacities, we 
often couched the choice of decision-making forum in 
analogies to certain administrative-law doctrines that, Porter 
argues, may not always work in a seamless fashion.  This is 
particularly so in equitable-discretion cases given that the 
primary focus of our earlier work was to distinguish 
policymaking from interpretation, so that “policy change 
cases” could be identified and referred to the court 
rulemaking process.  Thus, even though we previously 
insisted that when courts provide guidance regarding the 
meaning of phrases like “when justice so requires” under 
Rule 15, such guidance could be delivered by adjudication; 
conceivably, such matters could turn on legislative facts and 
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 Id. at 1207. 
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 Id. at 1207–09. 
 
72
 Id. at 1209–11. 
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 Id. at 1211–12. 
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would presumably require the resolution of a Chevron-step-
two-like ambiguity, which under our schema would weigh in 
favor of referral to the Advisory Committee.  Moreover, it is 
not clear that the provision of such guidance in equitable-
discretion cases would necessarily be treated as an 
“interpretive rule” under existing administrative law 
doctrine, again weighing in favor of referral to the Advisory 
Committee under our past proposals. 
The question raised by Porter’s article, then, is whether 
such equity standard-setting cases should be referred to the 
court rulemaking process, or whether they should continue 
to be resolved by the Court through the use of traditional 
tools of statutory construction in adjudication.  Consistent 
with our increased focus on institutional competencies and 
with a new complementary analogy to administrative law 
doctrine, we continue to agree with Porter that equity 
standard-setting cases should be resolved by the Supreme 
Court in adjudication.  Specifically, we think that when the 
Court provides guidance to lower courts regarding the 
proper application of the equitable standards set forth in the 
rules, the Court is providing the rough equivalent of “general 
statements of policy.”74  This is partly the case because the 
Court is providing guidance to its subordinates regarding 
how it plans to interpret or apply the rules in the future, and 
such guidance has informational value that helps to 
facilitate the consistent and predictable application of the 
law in a context where the Court (or agency heads) could not 
feasibly review every decision.  It makes sense to offer this 
guidance in adjudication, continuing the administrative law 
analogy, because agencies are similarly not required to use 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures when they 
provide such guidance.
75
  Finally, while such guidance 
channels discretion and provides the lower courts with 
useful information about the relevant factors that should 
inform their decisions when they implement the rules, the 
guidance does not change the substance of the rules or 
ordinarily dictate the result in any particular case.
76
 
 
 
74
 See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural 
Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 339–44 (2011) (providing 
a helpful overview of the applicable law, and recommending deferential 
standards for judicial review of the validity of guidance documents). 
 
75
 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012). 
 
76
 For these reasons, administrative guidance is not binding upon the 
public.  Of course, the Court’s decision is binding precedent for lower courts 
as a matter of stare decisis.  Again, we do not mean to suggest that this 
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In refining our view here, we also take Porter’s lead and 
focus more heavily on the form of reasoning to be employed, 
not necessarily the questions presented, in developing a 
choice-of-decision-making-forum theory in Rules cases.  To 
this end, we adopt Professors Kozel and Pojanowski’s 
distinction between prescriptive and expository reasoning in 
administrative decision-making as helpful, even if not perfect 
in every instance.
77
  They describe decisions that call for the 
weighing of evidence, utilizing technical expertise, and 
making value judgments as prescriptive; while defining 
decisions that call for an analysis of the drafter’s intent or 
the boundaries of judicial case law as expository.
78
  In 
accord with our model for Rules interpretation, Kozel and 
Pojanowski conclude that prescriptive reasoning—or what 
we have labeled policy-change decisions and what Porter 
identifies as one type of managerial reasoning—constitutes 
one of the “core competencies” of informal agency decision-
making.
79
  In our view then, if the resolution of a Rules 
dispute in a cert-worthy case would primarily hinge upon 
prescriptive reasoning (knowing full well that most cases will 
not solely involve one mode of reasoning or the other), then 
the dispute should go to the Advisory Committee because it 
has the stronger institutional capacities to take on such a 
task.  Conversely, as Kozel and Pojanowski demonstrate, the 
appellate courts hold the institutional advantage when it 
comes to expository reasoning—or what we label as cases 
deploying the traditional tools of statutory construction 
broadly conceived.
80
  In these cert-worthy cases, where the 
predominant mode of discourse will be expository—be it in 
implementing a relatively detailed rule-based regime or in 
fine-tuning equitable standards for lower-court application—
the Court should retain the matter for its own disposition 
sitting as a judicial entity. 
In sum, deploying a finer-toothed comb to distinctions 
among Rules cases illustrates where we would keep 
company with Porter and where we would forge a different 
 
analogy is perfect, but it does provide further evidence of the value of using 
administrative law principles to inform the Court’s regulation of the field of 
civil procedure. 
 
77
 Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 
UCLA L. REV. 112, 143 (2011) (noting that the distinction between prescriptive 
and expository decision making is not always crystal clear). 
 
78
 Id. at 141–43. 
 
79
 Id. at 141. 
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 Id. at 148–49. 
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path.  When it comes to what we label “equitable-discretion” 
cases, we largely concur with Porter’s approach, if not her 
nomenclature.  The lower courts hold all the institutional 
advantages to the speedy and just exercise of discretion in 
individual cases, but the Supreme Court can properly 
channel such discretion by providing interpretive guidance 
by way of expository reasoning—to use administrative-law 
parlance—through adjudication and by reversing abuses of 
discretion in appropriate cases.  We part company with 
Porter, however, in policy-change cases.  In our view, just as 
Porter rightly insists that the lower courts possess 
institutional advantages over both the Supreme Court and 
the Advisory Committee in cases that call for the exercise of 
equitable discretion, we should recognize that in terms of 
broad pronouncements of innovative policy that rely 
primarily upon prescriptive reasoning, the Advisory 
Committee holds an institutional advantage.  Our approach, 
as detailed in the next section, aims to make the fullest use 
of the Advisory Committee’s strengths as a policymaker. 
B. The “Mulliszewski Model” and its Strengths 
Our most fundamental difference with Porter lies with 
who should set Rules policy.  We maintain that the Court 
should avoid making civil-procedure policy through its 
adjudicatory power and that major policy choices in this 
field should be made, in the first instance, by lower courts, 
and then by referring any cert-worthy, non-statutory-
construction questions that emerge from their management 
of federal litigation to the rulemaking process.  We agree 
with Porter that there is a legitimate place for “managerial 
Rules interpretation,” be it in exercising discretion or in 
altering policy, within the federal judicial system, but we 
think that this role should be carried out by lower courts 
and the congressionally-designated lawmakers in this area—
namely, the Advisory Committee.  In this Part, we briefly 
describe our proposed model, explain how each of its 
components matches or promotes the actual competencies of 
the relevant institutional actors, and then briefly respond to 
Professor Porter’s critique of our approach. 
First, we agree with Porter that the Court should 
continue to use adjudication to resolve interpretive problems 
involving the rules by using traditional tools of statutory 
construction in appropriate cases.  The Court should only 
decide such cases, however, when the issues are cert-worthy 
under the Court’s normal standards for making such 
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determinations,
81
 and the case is capable of being resolved 
pursuant to “statutory rules interpretation.”82  Unlike Porter, 
we would include within this category cases such as Foman 
where the Court could use a purposive or intentionalist 
approach to provide guidance regarding the proper 
application of a policy established by the Advisory 
Committee.  Like Porter, however, we agree that the Court’s 
guidance on such issues should be implemented by the 
lower courts on remand. 
Second, we contend that cases involving the application 
of equitable standards should be resolved initially—and, for 
the most part, exclusively—in the lower federal courts.  This 
includes cases that require the lower courts to apply an 
equitable or discretionary standard to the facts of a 
particular case, which do not ordinarily require any high-
court review as the Supreme Court does not function as an 
error-correction institution—a role better played by the 
courts of appeals.
83
  While we agree with Porter that the 
Court should apply an abuse of discretion standard to any 
such cases, we think it would typically be better if the Court 
dispensed with such review altogether—excepting those 
cases where a circuit split (or other indicia of cert-
worthiness) would require taking up the matter.  If, as Porter 
suggests, more deference to the lower courts is appropriate 
in this context, this result can be achieved (even more 
effectively than she suggests) by the Court’s normal practice 
of denying certiorari in such cases.  Lower-court 
predominance or exclusivity in the realm of managerial rules 
interpretation should, however, also extend to cases that 
involve policy choices regarding the best understanding of 
the rules in a particular context, including cases that turn 
heavily on prescriptive considerations.  We anticipate that 
the percolation of such issues in the lower courts will often 
yield consensus, in which case Supreme Court intervention 
will typically be unnecessary.
84
  There will, however, 
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 See SUP. CT. R. 10 (setting forth “Considerations Governing Review on 
Certiorari”). 
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 As noted above, we provided standards for making this determination, 
which were drawn from various analogies to administrative law doctrine, in 
our original proposal.  See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1215–34. 
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 Cf. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME 
COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 1–2 
(1986) (statement of Chief Justice Vinson) (“The Supreme Court is not, and 
never has been, primarily concerned with the correction of errors in lower 
court decisions.”). 
 
84
 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural 
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undoubtedly be situations in which lower courts with a 
plurality of perspectives regarding the best manner of 
managing federal litigation will disagree about the proper 
resolution of a policy issue, in which case the Court may 
eventually want or need to intervene. 
Third, we claim that in this latter situation, the Court 
should refer policy questions that cannot be decided with 
traditional tools of statutory construction, which under a 
well-ordered cert-granting system should account for most 
“headline-grabbing” cases—for resolution pursuant to the 
court rulemaking process.  More specifically, we have 
suggested that “the Court could summarily grant the writ of 
certiorari, vacate the lower court opinion, remand the case, 
and order a stay pending action by the Advisory 
Committee.”85  At this point, the Court could “forward the 
issue to the Advisory Committee for notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.”86  Under our proposal, the Court as 
adjudicatory body should not decide the merits of the policy 
dispute at issue. 
We believe that the foregoing division of responsibilities 
would best promote the competencies of the relevant 
institutional actors.  Our proposal therefore recognizes that 
there is little need to use rulemaking procedures to address 
problems that can be resolved by using traditional tools of 
statutory construction.  Rather, courts are well situated to 
ascertain how the rulemakers previously decided such 
questions or to flesh out the contours of equitable standards 
during the course of adjudication.  Accordingly, if the Court 
can use the method of “statutory rules interpretation” to 
resolve an important dispute about the best understanding 
of the rules at issue, it should continue to use its 
adjudicatory authority to do so.  If, however, a case presents 
an unanticipated problem that was not previously resolved 
by the rulemakers, or the Court wants to change the 
controlling understanding of the rules, the Court should 
refer the relevant questions to the Advisory Committee for 
resolution pursuant to the rulemaking process.  As we 
previously explained in some detail, notice-and-comment 
 
Judiciary: On the Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1021, 1053 (2014) (describing the premium that the federal 
judicial system places “on disparate decision makers all reaching the same 
conclusion” in the lower courts). 
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 Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 16, at 1236 (describing our proposed 
“referencing” procedure). 
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rulemaking provides substantial advantages for making 
policy decisions of this nature.
87
  Finally, we believe that 
allowing the lower courts to exercise predominant control 
over the equitable discretion and policymaking that occurs 
in federal litigation provides a variety of institutional 
advantages as well.  As explained above, some rules are 
explicitly designed to give lower courts equitable discretion 
to apply broad standards based on a variety of factors and 
thereby achieve the best result based on the facts of a 
particular case.  There is typically no reason for the Court to 
second-guess how lower courts exercise their equitable 
discretion by reviewing such cases.  Moreover, lower-court 
judges tend to have substantially greater experience and 
expertise than do the justices when it comes to managing 
federal litigation,
88
 and it would therefore stand to reason 
that lower-court judges would be significantly better at 
deciding procedural issues of first impression than the 
Court.  When difficult or controversial issues emerge that 
ultimately result in differences of opinion among the lower 
courts, their competing perspectives—and the learning that 
results from their divergent approaches—should provide 
valuable information to the Advisory Committee when it 
eventually embarks upon the task of establishing a uniform 
solution to the problem through the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process.
89
 
In contrast to our model, Porter’s proposed solutions 
would forego the advantages of making major policy 
decisions through a democratic rulemaking process, and she 
simultaneously underestimates the value of allowing lower 
courts to maintain control over the more discretionary 
aspects of rules interpretation in federal litigation.  
 
 
87
 See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (summarizing these 
advantages). 
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 See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play 
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 86–87 (2010) (“The 
Justices do not have the time, trial-court experience, or on-the-ground 
information to evaluate the consequences that procedural changes may have 
on private enforcement of substantive law or what alternative enforcement 
mechanisms should be established if litigation pathways are impaired.”). 
 
89
 It bears noting that administrative agencies frequently experiment with 
different approaches to a policy problem pursuant to adjudication, before 
promulgating a legislative rule that codifies their preferred solution.  See 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., I ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.9, at 376–77 (4th 
ed., 2002) (recognizing that an administrative agency sometimes has good 
reasons for acting pursuant to adjudication, including the “desire to defer an 
effort to issue a generally applicable rule until after it has educated itself by 
conducting a series of adjudications in varying contexts”). 
2016] INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE  83 
Meanwhile, Porter’s criticisms of our proposed model are 
largely misplaced.  Perhaps most fundamentally, she 
suggests that in criticizing the Court’s practice of policy 
change via adjudication, we have questioned the Court’s 
power to reshape the Federal Rules through adjudication.
90
  
As explained above, however, we have explicitly emphasized 
that our proposal is based on a normative conclusion that 
major policy decisions in civil procedure should be made 
pursuant to the court rulemaking process essentially as a 
matter of good government.
91
  We acknowledge the Court’s 
authority to make policy pursuant to adjudication.
92
  Indeed, 
the Court’s authority to make policy pursuant to either 
rulemaking or adjudication was central to our proposed 
analogy between administrative agencies and the Court’s 
regulation of civil procedure.
93
 
We also agree for many of the reasons that Porter has 
articulated that “[a]ny framework for Rules interpretation 
must . . . consider and accommodate both paradigms [of 
rules interpretation] rather than simply wishing one away.”94  
Our proposed model would accommodate both paradigms by 
providing for statutory rules interpretation in adjudication 
by the Court, directing application of discretionary regimes 
to the lower courts, and sending policy changes to the 
rulemaking process.  We thoroughly agree that many of the 
virtues that Porter ascribes to “managerial rules 
interpretation” are indeed virtues95—when this mode of rules 
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 See, e.g., Porter, supra note 1, at 128 (citing our work, among others, 
for the proposition that it may “be tempting to argue that . . . the Court’s 
managerial Rules decisions are an abuse of power”); id. at 154 (“[The Court-as-
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head of the judicial branch.”); id. at 181–82 (“[Mulligan and Staszewski] view 
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interpretation.”). 
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 See id. at 1194–1205.  Porter claims that the Court’s managerial 
decisions are not always as path-breaking as we suggest, and that 
sometimes—such as in Twombly and Iqbal—the Court is following the lead of 
lower courts.  See Porter, supra note 1, at 154–55.  She also points out that 
the Court is in dialogue with a broader constituency than the parties to a case.  
See id.  These strike us as further reasons for the Court to refer proposed 
policy changes to the Federal Rules to the court rulemaking process. 
 
94
 Porter, supra note 1, at 129. 
 
95
 See id. at 150 (describing Moore’s arguments for a more activist 
approach to civil rules interpretation); id. at 165–68 (explaining that the Court 
is exercising equitable interpretive power that was “primarily intended to 
belong to the trial judge, who by virtue of her close relationship to the case is 
in a better position than appellate courts to grasp the facts and the 
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interpretation is utilized by lower courts.
96
 We believe, 
however, that other changes to the controlling 
understanding of the rules should be referred to the 
rulemaking process. 
Porter contends that the latter component of our 
proposal raises logistical difficulties,
97
 unduly weakens the 
influence of the Court (which, in turn, creates an incentive 
for the Justices to make policy through adjudication),
98
 and 
fits uncomfortably with the authority that Congress 
delegated to the Court through the Rules Enabling Act.
99
  
The Rules Enabling Act, however, contemplates that major 
policy changes to the rules should be accomplished 
pursuant to the rulemaking process.
100
  Moreover, the 
committee process and notice-and-comment procedures that 
limit the Court’s ability to dictate the precise content of the 
Rules have been required by Congress since 1988.  The 
Court has not possessed a full-throated, non-statutorily 
constrained license to control civil procedure by way of 
inherent authority since at least 1872.
101
  Thus, we are 
hardly seeking “to drastically minimize the Court’s role in 
the rulemaking process.”102  Congress already has done so—
repeatedly.  We therefore believe that our proposed model 
comports more fully with the requirements of the Rules 
Enabling Act than Porter’s suggested alternative.  That said, 
we have never suggested that the current rulemaking 
process is perfect.  On the contrary, we have proposed 
statutory changes to the court rulemaking process that 
would increase its efficiency and likely enhance the role of 
the justices.
103
  We briefly describe and elaborate on these 
proposed reforms, which are responsive to Porter’s 
 
relationship between parties,” and recognizing that the Court’s use of those 
methods has a substantially greater policy impact); id. at 175 (“The Court’s 
managerial approach to the Rules provides an important escape route from a 
system that might otherwise tend toward becoming hypertechnical and 
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remaining criticisms, in the final Part of this Essay. 
Before moving on, however, we would like to address 
briefly a final concern raised by Porter that is admittedly a 
bit more difficult.  Specifically, she claims that “it is unclear 
whether the Court would feel any degree of constraint from a 
suggestion that it must either use traditional statutory 
interpretation tools or route a Rules interpretation question 
through the rulemaking process.”104  Alternatively, she 
suggests that “if the Court wished to interpret a Rule 
through adjudication, it could simply squeeze its policy 
views through the lens of statutory interpretation.”105  In 
other words, Porter points out that our proposal cannot 
prevent willful justices from cheating.  This is true, and we 
would go further and acknowledge that there is nothing to 
force the Court to adopt our proposed model in the first 
place, and there would be no outside enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that the model would be properly 
implemented if adopted.  For these reasons, our proposal 
admittedly relies on the good faith efforts of the Court.  We 
believe, however, this is to some extent inevitable, because 
interpretive methodology and other legal doctrines of this 
nature cannot prevent truly willful justices from achieving 
results that comport with their policymaking preferences.
106
  
The adoption of our proposed model would nonetheless be 
more constraining that the usual situation in administrative 
law, which typically leaves the choice of policymaking form 
to an agency’s sound discretion.107  In any event, we believe 
that the Justices should be receptive to our good-
government-based arguments for making policy decisions 
through the rulemaking form if they are being intellectually 
honest.  Several of them were administrative law professors, 
after all, where the advantages of rulemaking over 
adjudication as a policymaking form are virtually 
uncontested.
108
  Finally, if our proposed model were adopted, 
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the Court would be taking an official position on the 
appropriate roles of statutory and managerial rules 
interpretation in federal litigation, and establishing some 
official standards of conduct and a division of 
responsibilities that matches the actual competencies of the 
relevant institutional actors.  If the Court continued to make 
major policy decisions pursuant to adjudication, few would 
be fooled. 
II 
REFERRING TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
In this last section, we consider Porter’s rejection of the 
referral of matters to the Advisory Committee as impractical.  
She suggests that our proposed model would be unwieldy 
and would unduly emasculate the Court, raising four 
specific objections to our preference in favor of referral to the 
Advisory Committee.
109
  We consider these objections briefly 
in turn, contending that the proper solution is to revise the 
rulemaking process in certain ways that we have previously 
suggested, rather than embracing a form of policy-changing 
interpretation for which the Court is poorly suited as a 
matter of institutional competence. 
First, Porter objects that the Advisory Committee lacks 
the wherewithal to “confront thorny fact-specific, substance-
specific problems that” call for discretionary decisions.110  In 
short, we entirely agree.  As we reiterated above,
111
 when a 
Rules regime calls for the application of lower-court 
discretion, that is exactly what should occur.  The lower 
court should exercise its sound discretion. 
Our disagreement with Porter on this score stems from 
what matters we deem amenable to traditional tools of 
statutory construction.  Porter seems to equate traditional 
tools of statutory construction with a strict textualism often 
espoused by Justice Scalia.
112
  She further concludes that 
abuse-of-discretion regimes are not consistent with 
statutory-construction analysis.
113
  Because we do not 
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 Id. at 179–81 (distinguishing statutory from managerial cases, and 
explaining that the latter involves “reviewing decisions that involve the lower 
courts’ application of a legal standard to the particular facts of an individual 
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equate traditional tools of statutory construction with a 
narrow form of textualism, our view of what may fall within 
the parameters of statutory construction is apparently 
broader than Porter’s. 
We think our understanding of the traditional approach 
to statutory construction is well founded in this context.
114
  
For example, the Court has recognized that “[a]nalysis of 
legislative history is, of course, a traditional tool of statutory 
construction.  There is no reason why we must confine 
ourselves to, or begin our analysis with, the statutory text if 
other tools of statutory construction provide better evidence 
of congressional intent with respect to the precise point at 
issue.”115  Thus, the issue “in any problem of statutory 
construction[] is the intention of the enacting body,”116 not 
necessarily the plain meaning of the text unadorned by the 
drafters’ purposes or the like.  In our view, then, a drafting 
body, be it Congress or the Advisory Committee, may use 
equitable or discretionary terms without rendering an 
assessment of the parameters of those terms beyond the 
scope of traditional tools of statutory construction as Porter 
seems to suggest.
117
  For example, even though “Congress 
included no explicit criteria for equitable subordination 
when it enacted § 510(c)(1) [of the Bankruptcy Code], the 
reference in § 510(c) to ‘principles of equitable subordination’ 
clearly indicates congressional intent at least to start with 
existing doctrine,” and interpretation of equitable 
subordination under § 510(c), which call for much lower-
court discretion, is amenable to the “principles of statutory 
construction.”118  Indeed, the fact that a drafting body uses 
language such as “‘public interest, convenience, or 
necessity’” to “express[] a policy . . . [to be applied within a 
 
case”). 
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set of] complicated factors for judgment” does not 
necessarily render the provision beyond the scope of 
statutory construction, at least with respect to the outer 
parameters of those terms.
119
 
We see this principle at play in the Rules as well.  Thus, 
in the Rule 23 context, district courts are properly granted 
broad discretion, but the boundaries of this discretion are 
not unlimited and are subject to appellate review.
120
  As we 
illustrated with our Rule 15 example above,
121
 we do not see 
the Supreme Court’s crafting of more precise standards for a 
Rules term such as “when justice so requires” inconsistent 
with deploying standard tools of statutory construction when 
the Court’s interpretation is furthering the purpose or intent 
of the drafters.  To be sure, Porter’s challenge to our view 
demonstrates the shortcomings of some of our 
administrative-law analogies with respect to equitable-
discretion cases, and where we may want to branch out in 
future work.  But we do not equate narrow textualism with 
traditional tools of statutory construction; and we think that 
it is a mistake to do so. 
Second, Porter argues that the many questions that 
would be facing the Advisory Committee if they were all 
referred to the court rulemaking process would be 
overwhelming, even though many of these issues are “trans-
substantive and thus appropriate for rulemaking.”122  We are 
not moved by this allegation.  Of course, the Advisory 
Committee drafted the entirety of the rules without being 
overwhelmed.  Moreover, the Advisory Committee regularly 
engages in wholesale, massive, substantive revisions—such 
as the recently enacted changes to discovery, electronically 
stored information, and case management—without 
becoming overwhelmed.
123
  We are not claiming the Advisory 
Committee is a super-human institution free from all 
fault.
124
  But as to the charge that the Advisory Committee 
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lacks the resources to take on big projects, Porter’s 
allegation lacks foundation in our view, particularly since 
the excessive burden that would allegedly have resulted from 
our proposal would merely have required the rule makers to 
have addressed four major policy issues over the course of 
approximately five years by Porter’s own calculations.125 
Third, Porter argues that the Advisory Committee 
process as currently constructed is too time consuming and 
overly alienates the Supreme Court itself from actively 
participating in the promulgation of the Rules.  Again, we 
entirely agree.  As we have argued previously, the court 
rulemaking process, like conventional depictions of agency 
rulemaking, has become ossified, often taking up to two and 
half years to promulgate rules.
126
  Key to the workability of 
our approach, then, may be the enactment of amendments 
to the current version of the Rules Enabling Act that would 
“return[] the rulemaking process to a three-step model that 
include[s] Advisory Committee rulemaking, Court review, 
and congressional report-and-wait,” which we estimated 
could reduce the time for rulemaking to 18 months. 
127
  This 
would constitute a temporal period that is within the norm 
for appellate adjudication, even if it is not swift in 
comparison to an idealized standard.
128
  More significantly, it 
is our view that with a return to a three-step, Rules 
promulgation approach, “the Court would be encouraged to 
revive its more active role in reviewing, evaluating, and 
contributing to potential changes to the Rules.”129  Thus, to 
the degree that Porter wishes to see a swifter rulemaking 
process with more direction from the Supreme Court itself, 
we fully concur and believe our approach more likely to 
achieve that end than her remand-based method. 
Fourth, Porter contends that our referral to the Advisory 
Committee model incorrectly focuses upon a Supreme Court 
versus Advisory Committee tug-of-war, when the proper 
issue is one of deference to the lower courts.
130
  This critique, 
we believe, again arises out of a fundamental 
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misunderstanding of our view.  Porter believes our approach 
is premised upon which institution has power or authority to 
craft procedural policy,
131
 a position we have specifically 
disclaimed.
132
  Ours is an approach based upon who holds 
institutional advantages, which we explored in detail in part 
I.B.  Hence, we reject a tug-of-war metaphor with its implicit 
“who has more power” connotation. 
CONCLUSION 
Porter’s article is an impressive and important one, 
which we believe is a must-read in the nascent field of civil 
rules interpretive theory.  We further applaud her 
application of an administrative-law paradigm to this topic.  
While our disagreements over aspects of her proposed 
approach are real, and we think substantial, we are 
heartened that Porter has renewed the scholarly focus upon 
civil rules interpretation.  Her critique of our position has 
sharpened our own presentation of our institutional-
competencies approach, and we are confident that her views 
will positively contribute to reform of the Court’s approach to 
future Rules cases, as well as to scholarly engagement with 
this increasingly significant topic. 
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